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1Two Cryptographic Schemes...
A
Secure under
assumptions A
B
Secure under
assumptions B
 Possible comparison criteria
 which scheme is more ecient?
 how do A and B relate?
 purpose-specic properties (e.g. ciphertext size)?
 rather easy to compare in the standard model
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 Comparison \biased" by random oracle dependency
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3Comparing The Schemes
 Comparison \biased" by random oracle
dependency
 e.g. A ( B, but H more demanding
than G
 RO G: provide randomness
 RO H: POWHF, CR, ...
 perhaps H even uninstantiable!
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4The Reduction Approach
 Formalizing exact requirements is tedious
 instead, use the cryptographer's approach: reduction
 AH secure ) BT
H
secure
 any hash function which makes A secure also makes B secure
 uninstantiability of B implies uninstantiability of A
 may require a non-trivial transformation T (stateless,
deterministic, ecient)
 guarantee \structural compatibilty"
 i.e., relative security amongst two schemes
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5Random Oracle Reducibility
6Semi-formal Denition
Scheme A fstrictly,strongly,weaklyg reduces to scheme B if for
every H there exists a transformation T such that
 strictly:
A is G
H
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 weakly:
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where GO
S denes a security game (think IND-CCA for example)
for scheme S
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8Example: Hashed ElGamal
 Twin hashed ElGamal (THEG) encryption scheme [CKS09]
 extends hashed ElGamal (HEG) encryption scheme, but milder
assumption
 DH assumption as opposed to strong DH assumption
 IND-CCA secure given an IND-CCA symmetric scheme
 hence superior at rst glance
 our result: THEG is strongly reducible to HEG
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9Proof of Reducibility
 THEG is strongly reducible to HEG
 Proof strategy
1. show weak reducibility from THEG to HEG
2. prove THEG secure on its own (in the ROM)
 strong reducibility then follows
10Scheme Details
HEG (scheme A)
EncA(m):
y   Zq
k   H(gy;Xy)
c   Ek(m)
return (gy;c)
THEG (scheme B)
EncB(m):
y   Zq
k0jjk1   G(gy;X
y
0 ;X
y
1 )
c   Ek0(m)
return (gy;c;k1)
 Oracles H and G: need transformation function
 TH(a;b;c) = H(a;b)jjH(a;c)
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11Proof Details
 Handling hash oracle queries
 alleged adversary B against THEG
 algorithm A performs TH(a;b;c) = H(a;b)jjH(a;c)
(a;b)
y0
y1
(a;c) T H
B
(a;b;c)
y0jjy1
A
12Proof Details
 Handling decryption queries
 algorithm A simulates second key half
B
m / ?
(Y;c)
m
k1
? = H(Y;Y
x1)
DecA
(Y;c;k1)
X0 x1   Zq; X1   g
x1 A X0;X1
13Proof Details
 Handling the encryption challenge query
 algorithm A simulates second key half
EncA
m0;m1
(Y;c)
B
m0;m1
(Y;c;k1)
k1   H(Y;Y
x1)
X0 A X0;X1
x1   Zq; X1   g
x1
14Proof Details
 Algorithm A outputs whatever B outputs
 all queries are simulated perfectly
 thus, A is successful whenever B is
 THEG is secure in the ROM (rather technical, see paper)
 hence strongly reducible
15Further Results/Applications
16Results on Signature Schemes
More examples of (strict) random oracle reductions
 probabilistic RSA FDH signatures reducible to
Guillou-Quisquarter signatures
 probabilistic RSA FDH signatures reducible to PSS signatures
 Schnorr signatures reducible to BLS signatures
recall: reducibility allows to argue about instantiability
17The End
Thank you!
?
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